Security Considerations

This document outlines security considerations, implemented protections, and known areas requiring attention in the core-tenant package.

Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

Workspace Scope Enforcement

The primary security mechanism is the BelongsToWorkspace trait which enforces workspace isolation at the model level.

How it works:

1. Strict Mode (default in web requests): Queries without workspace context throw MissingWorkspaceContextException
2. Auto-assignment: Creating models without explicit workspace_id uses current context or throws
3. Cache invalidation: Model changes automatically invalidate workspace-scoped cache

Code paths:

// SAFE: Explicit workspace context
Account::forWorkspace($workspace)->get();

// SAFE: Uses current workspace from request
Account::ownedByCurrentWorkspace()->get();

// THROWS in strict mode: No workspace context
Account::query()->get(); // MissingWorkspaceContextException

// DANGEROUS: Bypasses scope - use with caution
Account::query()->acrossWorkspaces()->get();
WorkspaceScope::withoutStrictMode(fn() => Account::all());

Middleware Protection

Middleware	Purpose
RequireWorkspaceContext	Ensures workspace is set before route handling
CheckWorkspacePermission	Validates user has required permissions

Recommendation: Always use workspace.required:validate for user-facing routes to ensure the authenticated user actually has access to the resolved workspace.

Known Gaps

1. SEC-006: The RequireWorkspaceContext middleware accepts workspace from headers/query params without mandatory user access validation. The validate parameter should be the default.

2. Cross-tenant API: The EntitlementApiController accepts workspace lookups by email, which could allow enumeration of user-workspace associations. Consider adding authentication scopes.

Authentication Security

Password Storage

Passwords are hashed using bcrypt via Laravel's hashed cast:

protected function casts(): array
{
    return [
        'password' => 'hashed',
    ];
}

Two-Factor Authentication

Implemented:

• TOTP (RFC 6238) with 30-second time steps
• 6-digit codes with SHA-1 HMAC
• Clock drift tolerance (1 window each direction)
• 8 recovery codes (20 characters each)

Security Considerations:

1. SEC-003: TOTP secrets are stored in plaintext. Should use Laravel's encrypted cast.

   • File: Models/UserTwoFactorAuth.php
   • Risk: Database breach exposes all 2FA secrets
   • Mitigation: Use 'secret_key' => 'encrypted' cast

2. Recovery codes are stored as JSON array. Consider hashing each code individually.

3. No brute-force protection on TOTP verification endpoint (rate limiting should be applied at route level).

Session Security

Standard Laravel session handling with:

• sessions table for database driver
• IP address and user agent tracking
• remember_token for persistent sessions

API Security

Blesta Integration API

The EntitlementApiController provides endpoints for external billing system integration:

Endpoint	Risk	Mitigation
POST /store	Creates users/workspaces	Requires API auth
POST /suspend/{id}	Suspends access	Requires API auth
POST /cancel/{id}	Cancels packages	Requires API auth

Known Issues:

1. SEC-001: No rate limiting on API endpoints

   • Risk: Compromised API key could mass-provision accounts
   • Mitigation: Add rate limiting middleware

2. SEC-002: API authentication not visible in Routes/api.php

   • Action: Verify Blesta routes have proper auth middleware

Webhook Security

Implemented:

• HMAC-SHA256 signature on all payloads
• X-Signature header for verification
• 32-byte random secrets (256-bit)

Code:

// Signing (outbound)
$signature = hash_hmac('sha256', json_encode($payload), $webhook->secret);

// Verification (inbound)
$expected = hash_hmac('sha256', $payload, $secret);
return hash_equals($expected, $signature);

Known Issues:

1. SEC-005: Webhook test endpoint could be SSRF vector
   • Risk: Attacker could probe internal network via webhook URL
   • Mitigation: Validate URLs against blocklist, prevent internal IPs

Invitation Tokens

Implemented:

• 64-character random tokens (Str::random(64))
• Expiration dates with default 7-day TTL
• Single-use (marked accepted_at after use)

Known Issues:

1. SEC-004: Tokens stored in plaintext

   • Risk: Database breach exposes all pending invitations
   • Mitigation: Store hash, compare with hash_equals()

2. No rate limiting on invitation acceptance endpoint

   • Risk: Brute-force token guessing (though 64 chars is large keyspace)
   • Mitigation: Add rate limiting, log failed attempts

Input Validation

EntitlementApiController

$validated = $request->validate([
    'email' => 'required|email',
    'name' => 'required|string|max:255',
    'product_code' => 'required|string',
    'billing_cycle_anchor' => 'nullable|date',
    'expires_at' => 'nullable|date',
    'blesta_service_id' => 'nullable|string',
]);

Note: blesta_service_id and product_code are not sanitised for special characters. Consider adding regex validation if these are displayed in UI.

Workspace Manager Validation Rules

The WorkspaceManager provides scoped uniqueness rules:

// Ensures uniqueness within workspace
$manager->uniqueRule('social_accounts', 'handle', softDelete: true);

Logging and Audit

Entitlement Logs

All entitlement changes are logged to entitlement_logs:

EntitlementLog::logPackageAction(
    $workspace,
    EntitlementLog::ACTION_PACKAGE_PROVISIONED,
    $workspacePackage,
    source: EntitlementLog::SOURCE_BLESTA,
    newValues: $workspacePackage->toArray()
);

Logged actions:

• Package provision/suspend/cancel/reactivate/renew
• Boost provision/expire/cancel
• Usage recording

Not logged (should consider):

• Workspace creation/deletion
• Member additions/removals
• Permission changes
• Login attempts

Security Event Logging

Currently limited. Recommend adding:

• Failed authentication attempts
• 2FA setup/disable events
• Invitation accept/reject
• API key usage

Sensitive Data Handling

Hidden Attributes

// User model
protected $hidden = [
    'password',
    'remember_token',
];

// Workspace model
protected $hidden = [
    'wp_connector_secret',
];

Guarded Attributes

// Workspace model
protected $guarded = [
    'wp_connector_secret',
];

Note: Using $fillable is generally safer than $guarded for sensitive models.

Recommendations

Immediate (P1)

1. Add rate limiting to all API endpoints
2. Encrypt 2FA secrets at rest
3. Hash invitation tokens before storage
4. Validate webhook URLs against SSRF attacks
5. Make user access validation default in RequireWorkspaceContext

Short-term (P2)

1. Add comprehensive security event logging
2. Implement brute-force protection for:
   • 2FA verification
   • Invitation acceptance
   • Password reset
3. Add API scopes for entitlement operations
4. Implement session fingerprinting (detect session hijacking)

Long-term (P3)

1. Consider WebAuthn/FIDO2 as 2FA alternative
2. Implement cryptographic binding between user sessions and workspace access
3. Add anomaly detection for unusual entitlement patterns
4. Consider field-level encryption for sensitive workspace data

Security Testing

Existing Tests

• WorkspaceSecurityTest.php - Tests tenant isolation
• TwoFactorAuthenticatableTest.php - Tests 2FA flows

Recommended Additional Tests

1. Test workspace scope bypass attempts
2. Test API authentication failure handling
3. Test rate limiting behaviour
4. Test SSRF protection on webhook URLs
5. Test invitation token brute-force protection

Compliance Notes

GDPR Considerations

1. Account Deletion: ProcessAccountDeletion job handles user data removal
2. Data Export: Not currently implemented (consider adding)
3. Consent Tracking: Not in scope of this package

PCI DSS

If handling payment data:

• stripe_customer_id and btcpay_customer_id are stored (tokens, not card data)
• No direct card handling in this package
• Billing details (name, address) stored in workspace model

Incident Response

If you discover a security vulnerability:

1. Do not disclose publicly
2. Contact: security@host.uk.com (hypothetical)
3. Include: Vulnerability description, reproduction steps, impact assessment